Outgoing Minister of Justice and Security, Foort van Oosten, today updated the House of Representatives on the measures taken following the major leak of state secret information at the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV). The House asked for this update following the espionage investigation into an NCTV employee who was found to have over 900 secret documents at home.

In February 2024, it was revealed that a 64-year-old NCTV employee, Ab el M., had been found with 928 secret documents. These included material from the AIVD and MIVD. The man was detained at Schiphol Airport in late October 2023 when he wanted to travel to Morocco. According to the Openbaar Ministerie 's Office, he had been in contact with Moroccan intelligence officials for years and allegedly collected and possibly leaked state secrets.
At his home were nearly 800 documents, 312 of which were classified as "state secrets." He also had more than 100 digital documents with him during his arrest at Schiphol Airport. The prosecution is still investigating some 46 terabytes of data carriers; a huge amount, comparable to 11.5 billion A4 sheets.
In response to the scandal, the House of Representatives passed two motions in April 2025:
In his letter, the minister writes that it simply cannot be determined with certainty which documents were actually leaked. As a result, a full damage analysis, as requested by the House, can never be made.
However, both the police and the NCTV did examine all the documents they did have at their disposal. In doing so, the police worked from a "worst-case scenario" and have already taken measures to mitigate risks to employees and investigations.
The NCTV is currently conducting its own damage investigation, for which it has requested access to the seized documents through the prosecution.
The minister reports that the system handling state secret information for personal security has now been re-evaluated and accredited on Oct. 21, 2025 for the duration of one year.
All processes are governed by the strict rules of the VIR-BI and the Government Information Security Baseline (BIO).
Following the intervention of the ADR (Audit Department Rijk), missing or poorly recorded USB sticks at the NCTV were also looked into. The records have since been tightened:
In addition, print permissions are restricted, records are kept of who prints what, and log files are actively monitored.
In addition to technical measures, there will also be a broader insider-threat program, focused on awareness, behavior and recognizing signs of possible abuse. The minister emphasizes that measures alone are not enough: culture and alertness within the organization must also be considered.
Van Oosten writes that both the police and the NCTV have taken "important steps" to prevent a recurrence. The House will be further briefed later, to the extent possible without sharing confidential information.
