On April 2, 2024, the House of Representatives passed, with reservations, the Data Processing Personalized Approach Radicalization and Terrorist Activities Bill. Privacy First Foundation is concerned about this because it is estimated that tens of thousands of Dutch citizens in the Netherlands are already in a Personalized Approach (PGA) with very far-reaching consequences for their fundamental rights and privacy, without adequate legal protection. Therefore, Privacy First believes that the existing practice should first be evaluated before PGAs are legally enshrined. Hopes are now pinned on the Senate to stop this bill until then.
A Personalized Approach means that the government wants to "resocialize" a citizen (1). This happens at the municipal level in a so-called case consultation under the responsibility of mayors and in cooperation with "chain partners," such as Police, Justice, Bureau of Youth Care, GGD, GGZ, probation and housing associations. These chain partners exchange information about citizens' personal lives and discuss how to get them on the straight and narrow, re-educate them.
In a PGA, a citizen first receives a "help offer" from, for example, Bureau of Youth Services or the Public Health Service. If that does not work, the citizen in question is confronted with repression (2) such as criminal proceedings or an out-of-home placement. Legally, there appears to be little that can be done against a person-centered approach. A PGA is not a "decision" in the sense of the General Administrative Law Act and therefore no objection and appeal is possible. The AVG legislation does not work here in practice because the government does not release complete files. As a result, no due process is possible.
The House of Representatives was hesitant about this new law. On the one hand, they think it is important that municipalities are given room to prevent terrorist attacks and radicalization. On the other hand, they fear that the definition of "radicalization" (3) is too broad and that, with this law, too many Dutch citizens could end up in a PGA unjustly and with all its adverse consequences. For example, the definition of radicalization is defined so broadly that it can include troublesome and confused people, troublesome youth, activists, critical journalists and citizens who distrust the government.
Moreover, the current practice of cooperation between chain partners based on covenants - which this law anchors - raises concerns. Now that PGAs have existed for a number of years, more and more is becoming known about citizens who were or are in a PGA. Some were even innocently in them and appeared to have no legal recourse. Citizens in a PGA complain mostly about lack of transparency and that they have no access to justice. They have no chance of a fair trial because governments and chain partners refuse to hand over complete files.
The invasions of privacy are not amiss either. PGAs are not only about data exchange between cooperating chain partners, as the new law makes it seem, but also about far-reaching interventions in someone's private life. Examples include the imposition of mediation care, out-of-home placements, video and audio recordings, the use of citizen informants, the building of criminal case files using secret investigative methods from the so-called "toolboxes," and the frequent observation, patrolling, apprehension of citizens and making it impossible for them to leave the country.
Privacy First estimates that tens of thousands of Dutch people are already in a PGA. This estimate is based on information from municipalities. The municipality of Amsterdam, for example, has its PGA programs here (4) in a list. Some of them concern large target groups such as the Top600, Safe Alternative (formerly the Top400), ex-prisoners, confused people and the so-called bullying approach. So in Amsterdam alone, thousands of people are in PGAs. PGAs are used by numerous municipalities throughout the Netherlands.
Last February, the National Ombudsman, Reinier van Zutphen, raised the alarm over a similar issue (5): Dutch citizens with a radicalization and terror stamp in the police, the CTER code. According to research by Follow The Money last year, this would also affect tens of thousands (6) of people. Last year, professor emeritus Bob de Graaff also wrote in the Groene Amsterdammer about the quiet advance (7) of policies against terrorism and radicalization. He too explicitly mentioned PGAs and police CTER codes and pointed out that these practices are already very extensive.
As early as 2009, the world's highest human rights body, the UN Human Rights Committee, expressed concerns about the Dutch PGA policy, then called "person-centered disruption." In particular, the UN had concerns about the lack of legal safeguards and judicial oversight. Since then, little has improved.
So far, PGAs are carried out on the basis of covenants between cooperating chain partners and are not anchored in law. Legally, it is therefore questionable whether current PGAs are lawful. Privacy First has been involved in a Top X PGA case for five years to litigate that out and provoke case law. The case is currently before the Council of State and will then be prosecuted in the European Court of Human Rights if necessary. Because the government wants assurance that PGAs are lawful, this is the first time that there will be a legal basis for some of the existing PGAs.
In response to hesitations about the scope, applications, possible institutional racism, and effectiveness of PGAs in practice, of which this law is, after all, an entrenchment, the House of Representatives stipulated that the new law be reviewed on these issues in one year. Then in five years there will be a larger review that will also address the legal protection of citizens in a PGA. Now it is up to the Senate to review the current bill (8).
Privacy First believes that it is better to test and evaluate the existing practice of PGAs based on covenants between cooperating chain partners before enshrining them in law. According to Privacy First, this is possible because several cases of Dutch citizens in a PGA have been in the news in recent years. In addition, Privacy First knows and follows several citizens in a PGA and can put politicians in touch with them. In this way, politicians can already learn from mistakes made and adjust the law earlier and more precisely.
(1) https://veiligheidscoalitie.nl/apothekerskast/persoonsgerichte-aanpak/#:~:text=Een%20persoonsgerichte%20aanpak%20(PGA)%20has,together%20with%20all%20involved%20chain partners.
(2) https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persoonsgerichte_aanpak
(3) https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/ronl-ed577756eda287affc0b60e5bdeed07f4cfd1f88/pdf
(4) https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organisatie/organisatie/overige/acvz/
(5) https://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/nieuws/nieuwsbericht/2024/nationale-ombudsman-start-onderzoek-naar-cter-registratie
(6) https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/veel-nederlanders-in-cter-register-politie
(7) https://www.groene.nl/artikel/privacy-of-veiligheid
(8) https://www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/36225_wet_gegevensverwerking