Imagine: a data center fails. Or worse—ransomware, sabotage, a physical attack, or a fatal system crash. Systems are offline, data is damaged, and logging has disappeared. From that moment on, a fundamental problem arises that goes far beyond technology alone.
Not only is it impossible to forensically determine exactly what happened, but the evidence that everything was in order before the incident also disappears. There is no longer any demonstrable compliance, no verifiable governance, and no objective evidence that there was no negligence. In the current legal reality, this is often more decisive than the cause of the incident itself.
For a long time, logging was seen as a technical tool. Something for administrators, auditors, and security teams. Useful, even necessary, but rarely a topic for the boardroom. Those days are behind us.
With the introduction of European legislation such as NIS2, DORA, GDPR, the Data Act, and EU e-Evidence, cybersecurity has explicitly become an administrative responsibility. Administrators can no longer hide behind technology or suppliers. They must be able to demonstrate that risks have been structurally managed, that governance processes were functioning, and that adequate action was taken when it mattered.
Paper alone is not enough. Policy documents, frameworks, and risk registers have no legal value if they are not supported by objectively verifiable data. Logging has thus shifted from being an operational tool to the foundation of administrative due diligence.
After an incident, regulators, insurers, and sometimes judges ultimately ask only one question: what can you prove? When logging is missing or has been demonstrably tampered with, it is no longer possible to determine which security measures were active, whether compliance was actually ensured, and whether processes were followed correctly. Even if an organization had everything in order, that reality disappears along with the logs.
The result is a legal vacuum. Good governance subsequently turns into unproven governance. And unproven governance is quickly seen as inadequate governance.
Many organizations rely on SIEM solutions as the backbone of their security strategy. These systems are indispensable for detection and incident response. But as soon as logging takes on a legal function, their limitations become painfully apparent.
An often overlooked reality is that logs are usually located within the same administrative domain as the rest of the IT infrastructure. This means that administrators—consciously or unconsciously—have the ability to modify, delete, or overwrite log data. This is not a theoretical risk. During the Libor scandal, it emerged that employees with administrator rights at Rabobank, among others, manipulated log files to conceal unauthorized trading activities. Precisely because the logging was not recorded independently, reconstruction afterwards became complex and legally ambiguous. For readers who are less familiar with this case,the Libor scandalled to billions in fines worldwide and showed how vulnerable financial systems become when the audit trail itself becomes part of the fraud.
Years later, large-scale cyber incidents demonstrated once again that this problem is not limited to financial fraud by insiders. The ransomware attack onColonial Pipelinein 2021, which led to the temporary shutdown of one of the United States' most important fuel pipelines, highlighted how vulnerable logging is during a crisis. Not only were systems encrypted, but the available audit trails also proved to be incomplete and difficult to reconstruct. As a result, it remained unclear for a long time exactly which systems had been affected, what data had been accessed, and during what time frame the attackers had been active. Despite modern security tooling, there was no irrefutable, independently recorded account of the facts.
These examples make it clear that logging that takes place within the same operational domain—whether on-premises or within a single cloud environment—always remains susceptible to doubt. This also applies when organizations rely on large cloud providers: as long as logging, storage, and management fall within the same administrative and legal domain, influence remains theoretically possible.
This brings logging directly into the debate about sovereign clouds and introduces an often underestimated risk: counterparty risk. It is not only the question of where data is stored that is relevant, but above all who has actual control over the burden of proof. Can a cloud provider—consciously or unconsciously—modify, filter, or deliver incomplete log data to mask its own shortcomings, malfunctions, or security incidents? As soon as that question cannot be answered unequivocally with "no," the legal evidential value of that logging evaporates.
Inspired by aviation,Digicorp Labsintroduces the concept of a digital Blackbox. Just like a flight recorder, it functions completely independently of operational IT and SIEM environments. TheBlackboximmutably records what actually happened, which security and compliance measures were active, and what actions were taken by people, systems, or autonomous agents.
It is crucial that not only incidents are recorded, but also the state of governance and risk management before things went wrong. In liability issues, this distinction proves to be essential. It is often not the question of what went wrong, but whether it can be demonstrated that everything was properly arranged before that moment that is decisive.
Within this Blackbox, each log line is cryptographically hashed, provided with an exact timestamp, and demonstrably sealed in an open blockchain. This creates a logging layer that is demonstrably tamper-proof and can be independently verified. A patent has now been granted for this innovative, blockchain-supported method of proving both data recording and data ownership by the official or system that approved the data. Seemy blogon this subject, ‘NFD: the birth certificate of data’.
The innovative recording of the data itself is based on the Hitachi Content Platform from Hitachi, a Japanese technology company and emphatically not an American hyperscaler. This means that the storage falls outside the scope of American legislation such as the Cloud Act. The platform is designed for compliance and long-term data preservation over decades, ensuring that evidence remains legally valid throughout the entire statutory retention period, regardless of changes in infrastructure, suppliers, or technology.
Legislation prescribes long retention periods, but does not require all data to be permanently available. By cleverly segmenting logging across different storage layers, compliance can be achieved without a cost explosion. Data needed for immediate incident response remains quickly accessible, while audit and reconstruction data is stored cost-effectively and data subject to legal retention requirements is stored securely within the appropriate jurisdictions. This ensures that data sovereignty and governance remain structurally guaranteed.
Many organizations depend on legacy systems that are not easy to migrate. That is understandable, but it is not a legal excuse. Here too, existing logging can be retained, protected, and independently sealed. This ensures that business-critical processes remain operational, while the burden of proof complies with modern legislation.
In a legally burdensome digital reality, logging is no longer a supporting IT function. It is an administrative line of defense. Those who lose their logging not only lose insight into what went wrong, but also the evidence that everything was properly arranged before that moment. The difference between explaining and proving increasingly determines the outcome of supervision, liability, and trust.
Don't explain what happened. But demonstrate what was in order.
