The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) recently terminated operations of an intelligence officer from the Russian civilian intelligence service SVR. The intelligence officer - who worked as an accredited diplomat at the Russian embassy in The Hague - engaged in espionage in the fields of technology and science. He built a substantial network of sources, all of whom are or were employed in the Dutch high-tech sector.

The Russian intelligence officer made contact with individuals with access to sensitive information within the high-tech sector.
Some individuals were paid by the intelligence officer in exchange for information.
A second Russian intelligence officer from the SVR, who was also accredited as a diplomat at the Russian Embassy in The Hague, performed a supporting role. Both intelligence officers have been declared "persona non grata" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This means they are no longer allowed to serve as diplomats in the Netherlands and must leave our country soon.
The Netherlands is among the most developed countries in the world in terms of economy, science and technology. Under the influence of globalization, this makes the Netherlands an attractive, but also increasingly vulnerable target for espionage.
Erik Akerboom, Director General of the AIVD: "As the AIVD, we are committed to limiting and, where possible, preventing damage to the economy and national security caused by espionage. We protect the strategic interests of the Netherlands by gathering intelligence that exposes this form of espionage. This allows us to disrupt espionage, as we have done in this case. We also make our society aware of the risks of espionage and explain to companies, governments and educational institutions how they can prevent it."
The high-tech sector has high-quality and unique knowledge. This espionage case has most likely caused damage to the organizations where the sources are or were active, and thus potentially to the Dutch economy and national security.
The Russian intelligence officer's interests included information on artificial intelligence, semiconductors and nanotechnology. Much of this technology is useful in both civilian and military applications.
The Russian intelligence officer's sources were tapped by the AIVD to disrupt their activities.
In a number of cases, the AIVD issued an official notice to companies involved and a higher education institution so that they could take action.
In one case, an official notice was issued to the IND. Based on this, the IND is taking immigration law measures against a source. The AIVD is investigating whether additional official reports can be issued to the IND.
We make no announcements about the identity of the sources and which companies and higher education institution are involved.
Because of the increasing vulnerability of the Netherlands to espionage, the Cabinet examined the added value of criminalizing espionage to the existing set of instruments.
Criminal law already provides opportunities to act against crimes related to violation of state, official and trade secrets. However, espionage - as in clandestine cooperation by individuals with a foreign intelligence service - is not currently punishable per se.
The Cabinet has determined that additional criminalization is desirable and will examine ways in which it can be given shape and then initiate a legislative process.
Read the House letter disrupting Russian economic espionage activities here
